Jean Monnet Chair

Informujemy, że członek zespołu JMC EUCRIS, dr Adam Kirpsza, wziął udział w the 26th IPSA World Congress of Political Science. Kongres odbył się zdalnie w dniach 10-15 lipca 2021 r. i był zorganizowany przez Międzynarodowe Stowarzyszenie Nauk Politycznych (IPSA - International Political Science Association). Dr Kirpsza przedstawił paper pt. Good Things Come In Small Packages? The Effect of Issue Linkage on Member States’ Bargaining Success in European Union Lawmaking.

Abstrakt papera:

This paper investigates how inter-institutional issue linkage (package lawmaking) affects member states’ bargaining success in European Union lawmaking. Issue linkage is defined as informal bargaining between the European Parliament and the Council in relation to a single or several proposals where both institutions exchange support for their preferred outcomes. While about 25% of EU legislation is decided through package deals and this share is growing, little is known about their impact on states’ success. The paper seeks to fill this lacuna. Drawing from the logrolling and relais actors theories, it expects that package lawmaking increases states’ bargaining success and is beneficial for countries holding a) extreme preferences, b) the EP rapporteurship or the Council Presidency, and c) superior power resources. The hypotheses are tested by a multi-level linear regression on the DEUII dataset (Thomson et al., 2012). Overall, contrary to expectations, member states are less successful in attaining their preferences under package deals. However, this effect varies with the type of issue linkage as multi-proposal packages decrease countries’ bargaining success, while single proposal logrolls rather increase it. The paper argues that this finding stems from the distinct characteristics of the two types of logrolls. Moreover, the analysis reveals that logrolling favors states with extreme preferences and those holding the rapporteur and presidency. By contrast, powerful states are not better off when a package deal is concluded. Finally, the paper unveils that logrolling generates a relatively symmetric distribution of success among member states, contrary to conventional negotiations which produce clear winners and losers.